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ABSTRACT
Calendar Anomalies at Istanbul Stock Exchange
Turkay OKTAY 
MBA in Management
Supervisor : Assist,Prof. Gulnur SENGUL 
February 1993, 61 Pages
A securities market in which market prices fully reflect 
all relevant information is called efficient. The Weak Form 
Efficient Market Hypothesis claims that there should not be any 
consistent patterns in security returns.
In this study, the existence of return patterns which is a 
indicator of weak form inefficiency of the market, are analyzed 
in Istanbul Stock Exchange. The period covered is in between 
January 4, 1988 and December 31, 1992 and studies are done 
through dividing the sample period into two parts.
The results of the analysis indicate that Istanbul Stock 
Exchange Market tends to be inefficient as time goes. 
Significant Day of the Week and Weekend Effect are found in the 
1990-1992 period. January Effect also exists in the market for 
the entire sample period. The reasons of effects do not fully 
explain the return patterns to exist which is also the same case 
in different security markets.
ÖZET
Istanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsasinda Takvim Etkileri
Tûrkay OKTAY
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, isletme Enstitüsü 
Tez Yöneticisi : Assist.Prof. Gülnur SENGUL 
Şubat 1993, 61 Sayfa
Hisse senedi fiyatlarinin bütün ilgili bilgiyi yansittigi 
hisse senedi piyasalari etkin olarak adlandirilirlar. Zayif 
Pazar Etkinlik Hipotezi hisse senedi getirilerinde tutarli bir 
patern olamayacagini iddia eder.
Bu (palismada, piyasanin Zayif Pazar Etkinliğine sahip 
olmadiginin göstergesi olan getiri paternlerini İstanbul Menkul 
Kiymetler Borsasinda varolup olmadigi arastirilmistir. 4 Ocak 
1988 ile 31 Aralik 1992 arasindaki dönem taranmis ve calismalar 
bu dönem ikiye bölünerek yapilmistir.
Analiz sonuçlari yillar geçtikçe İstanbul Menkul Kiymetler 
Borsasinin etkinsizlige doğru bir eğilime girdiğini 
göstermiştir. 1990-1992 periyodunda istatistiki olarak önemli 
Haftanin Günleri Etkisi ve Haftasonu Etkisi bulunmuştur. Bütün 
analiz periyodu süresincede Ocak Etkisi bulunmuştur. Etkilerin 
diğer dünya borsalarinda görülen oluşma nedenleri gene diğer 
borsalarda olduğu gibi İstanbul Menkul Kiymetler Borsasinda da 
getiri paternlerinin olusmasini tam olarak açiklayamamistir.
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I.INTRODUCTION
In modern economies, financial assets arise due to the need 
for financing excess of investment over saving, because savings 
are usually not equal to investment in real assets for all 
economic units in an economy over all periods of time.
The purpose of financial markets is to allocate savings 
efficiently to ultimate users. The more diverse the patterns of 
desired savings and investment among economic units, the greater 
the need for efficient financial markets to channel savings to 
ultimate users. The ultimate investor in real assets and the 
saver should be brought together at the least possible cost and 
inconvenience (Van Horne [22]).
The market for common stocks constitutes an important part 
of the financial markets. Besides being the basic source of long 
term equity financing for corporations, it can provide even very 
short term investment opportunities for individual investors.
If securities markets are efficient, prices will reflect 
all known information. As a result, prices will change only as 
new information arrives. But, by definition, new information 
will be random. If information flows followed an identifiable 
trend, this trend will become known and thus be reflected in 
current prices. Thus, new information must be random. And since 
new information enters randomly and prices react instantaneously 
to the information, changes in stock prices will be random 
(Robert Radcliffe [20]).
If security prices can be relied upon to reflect the
economic signals which the market receives, then they can also 
be looked to provide useful signals to both suppliers and users 
of capital, the former for the purposes of constructing their 
investment portfolios, and the latter for establishing criteria 
for the efficient disposition of funds at their disposal. Lack 
of confidence in the pricing efficiency of the market tends to 
focus the attention of both investors and raisers of capital on 
potentially wasteful techniques of exploiting perceived 
inefficiencies, and away from a more positive recognition of the 
messages contained in the market's prices (Keane [17]).
In an efficient market, security prices follow what is 
referred as a random walk. A price rise on day 0 doesn't 
increase or decrease the odds of a price on day 1, day 2, etc. 
Price changes on any particular day are uncorrelated with 
historical price changes. If the random walk hypothesis is valid 
there should not be any consistent patterns in security returns.
The aim of this study is to analyze the existence of return 
patterns in Turkish Security Market and institutional factors 
underlying these patterns.
This study covers the five year period from January 1988 to 
December 1 992. In part II of this study the concept and 
implications of efficients market are summarized. Part II also 
contains early tests of randomness and relevant literature of 
recent studies about calendar anomalies on security returns. In 
part III, an explanation of the sample and methodology used in 
analyzing the return patterns is given. Daily returns are 
regressed against returns of the market to find systematic
anomalies including day of the week, weekend, months and turn of 
the year. Findings of analysis and major differences of results 
of two periods are given in Part IV. Part V includes 
conclusions, suggestions for further research and shortcomings 
of the study.
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
A. EFFICIENT MARKET THEORY
Efficient Market Theory (EMT) states that the security 
market is a fair game : the odds of having a future return 
greater than should be expected given a security's risk are the 
same as the odds of having a lower return than should be 
expected. There is no way to use the information available at a 
given point in time in order to earn an abnormal return. 
Positive returns will be expected, of course, because securities 
contain risk for which a risk premium will be earned. However, 
long-run abnormal returns will be zero (Radcliffe [20]).
Security prices are determined by expectations of 
future economic profits, risks, and interest rates. In 
developing such expectations, individuals assess any information 
which is available at that time. While list of relevant 
information is almost endless, the point is that such 
information is crucial to making a pricing decision. It is in 
this sense that theorists can say that security prices migth 
fully reflect all relevant information. A securities market in 
which market prices fully reflect all known information is 
called "efficient".
Paradoxically, security markets can be efficient only 
if a large number of people disagree with the EMT and attempt to 
find ways of earning speculative profits. To make a speculative 
profit, an individual must hold unique information about a 
security which other market participants are unaware of. As soon
as new information is obtained, speculators who have the 
information will immediately trade. If the speculators discover 
favorable information, they will immediately sell. As a result, 
profit maximizing speculators will attempt to obtain information 
before other market participants. This results in a race for new 
information and, at the extreme, all information will be 
reflected in security prices as soon as it becomes available.
The term price efficient is used to indicate that
security markets are efficient in processing information. Prices
will not adjust to new information with a lag but, instead,
1instantaneously. Four conditions are necessary to have such an 
efficiently priced market :
1 . Information is costless and available to all market 
participants at the same point in time. (Participants have 
homogenous expectations.)
2. There are no transaction costs, taxes, or other barriers 
to trading, (the markets are frictionless.)
3. Prices are not affected by the trading of a single 
person or institution. (Participants are price takers.)
4. All individuals are rational maximizers of expected 
utility.
Clearly, all four conditions are not strictly true. 
Information is provided to some individuals before others, and 
some individuals might be more adept at creating new information
7 ; Radcliffe[20] conditions for an efficient market which
also set by many other acedemicians
by interrelating a complex set of previously available 
information. But if this is true, amateur investors (who tend to 
receive information last and are least able to analyze it) would 
hire well-informed professionals to provide them with the 
information and to manage their portfolios. In this way amateur 
investors would be capable of indirectly trading on information 
as soon as it becomes known. The second condition is clearly 
untrue since transaction costs, taxes, and legal investment 
restrictions do exist.
Because these criteria aren't strictly true in the real 
world, a distinction is made between a "perfectly efficient" and 
an "economically efficient" market. A perfectly efficient market 
is the one in which prices always reflect all known information, 
prices adjust instantaneously to new information, and 
speculative profits are simply a matter of luck. In an 
economically efficient market, prices might not adjust 
instantaneously to information, but, over the long run, 
speculative profits can't be earned after transaction costs such 
as brokerage comissions and taxes are paid.
B. IMPLICATIONS OF AN EFFICIENT MARKET
From a philosophic standpoint, an efficient capital market 
is a crucial component of any capitalisitic society. With an 
efficient capital market, security prices provide accurate 
signals for capital allocation. Security prices of high-risk 
industries will be set so that high rates of returns will be 
both demanded and expected. Security prices of low-profit
industries will be low and discourage further investment. 
Conversely, industries which fulfill an important public need 
will have potentially high profits, resulting in high security 
prices and an influx of needed capital. Thus, an efficiently 
priced security market properly assesses the future of 
particular industries and allocates capital as needed. When 
firms sell securities, they expect to receive fair prices. When 
investors purchase securities, they expect to pay fair prices.
Second, in an efficient security market, speculative 
profits are, on average, nonexistent. Because security prices 
reflect all known information, mispriced securities are 
impossible to find. Speculators who believe they have identified 
such a mispriced security are actually missing a crucial bit of 
information. Over time speculative trading does nothing but 
reduce the speculator's wealth as transaction costs and taxes 
are incurred which are offset by speculative profits. 
Occasionally, some speculators will 'luck-out' and earn 
substantial profits. But this is not due to any permanent 
insigth or ability on their part. Instead, such profits are due 
solely to chance and would be available to passive investors as 
well. For every lucky speculator there is an equally unlucky 
speculator. Speculation is a zero-sum game. Since speculative 
profits are, on average, not available, investing yields a 
larger return for any risk level. An investment strategy 
consists of (1) selecting an acceptable portfolio risk level, 
(2) broadly diversifying, and (3) never trading simply because 
one believes prevailing prices are too high or too low.
Investors trade only when they have a cash deficiency or excess 
and to take advantage of various tax laws.
An additional implication of an efficient market is that 
the demand curve for a security should be perfectly elastic. 
Since all investors hold the same information, they will all 
agree upon the same fair market price. Investors are said to 
have homogenous expectations.
C. FORMS OF EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
Market efficiency is generally discussed within the 
framework presented in Fame's 1970 survey article. A market in 
which prices always "fully reflect" available information is 
called efficient. Fama suggested that the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) can be divided into three categories : the weak 
form, the semi-strong form and the strong form. If the security 
markets are efficient in the weak form sense, then investors 
should not be able to consistently earn abnormal profits by 
simply observing the historical prices of securities. The semi­
strong form EMH asserts that security prices adjust rapidly and 
correctly (direction and speed) to the release of all publicly 
available information. Under the strong form EMH, security 
prices are expected to fully reflect all information, including 
both published and unpublished (monopolistic) information.
D. TESTS ABOUT MARKET EFFICIENCY
If prices fully reflect all known historical information, 
such price and volume data would'be reflected in existing
security prices. Technical strategies would be useless. To the 
extent that historical security price patterns might have aided 
security selection in the past, the information will be 
accounted for in today's prices and will then be of no marginal 
use. Empirical tests of technical analysis are referred to as 
"weak-form" tests of the EMT.
A more stringent requirement of the EMT is that when a 
new piece of information becomes publicly available, it is 
instantaneously accounted for in prices. For example, if a firm 
announces larger operating cash flows than had been anticipated, 
the informational value of the announcement will be immediately 
reflected in stock prices. A lag in price adjustment (which 
would allow speculators to trade profitably) would not exist. 
Similarly, if the Federal Reserve were to increase the money 
supply growth rate by more than had been expected, stock prices 
would rise instantaneously. Emprical tests which examine how 
accurately security prices adjust to new information are 
referred as "semistrong-form" tests.
The "strong-form" version of EMT states that all 
individuals have exactly the same set of information. No one has 
a monopoly on relevant information. Because certain groups - 
security analysts, portfolio managers and corporate insiders - 
are often said to have the best knowledge about particular 
stocks, emprical tests of strong-form market efficiency have 
focused on their performance relative to the market performance.
E. USEFULNESS OF HISTORICAL PRICES : WEAK-FORM TESTS
If securities markets are efficient, prices will reflect 
all known information. As a result, prices will change only as 
new information arrives. But, by definition, new information 
will be random. If information flows followed an identifiable 
trend, this trend will become known and thus be reflected in 
current prices. Thus, "new" information must be random. And 
since new information enters randomly and prices react 
instantaneously to the information, changes in stock prices will 
be random.
In an efficient market, security prices follow what is 
referred to as a random walk. By this we mean that price changes 
over time are random. A price rise on day 0 doesn't increase or 
decrease the odds of a price rise on day 1, day 2, etc. Price 
changes on any particular day are uncorrelated with historical 
price changes. If security prices do, indeed, follow a random 
walk, technical trading rules are useless. For example :
1. Cycles won't exist.
2. Charting price patterns such as head-and-shoulder moves, 
inverted saucers, and rising pennants is of no value in 
predicting future prices.
3. Trading rules such as odd-lot behavior, moving averages, 
and relative strength are not roads to riches for anyone but 
stockbrokers.
Statistical tests which examine the usefulness of 
historical prices to predict future prices are of two basic 
types : (1) tests which examine the correlation between price
10
changes and (2) tests which examine the profitability of various 
technical trading rules.
F. RETURN PATTERNS
If the random v/alk hypothesis is valid, there should not be 
any consistent patterns in security returns. While early tests 
of random walk did not detect any strong evidence that returns 
patterns exist, more recent studies have found persuasive 
evidence of systematic patterns in stock returns. These patterns 
are referred as :
1. The January Effect^
2. The Monthly Effect^
3. The Weekly Effect^
4. The Daily Effect^
The January Effecy refers to the fact that stock returns in 
January are greater than returns in other months. This is 
particularly true for stocks of relatively small firms.
A difference has also been found in the pattern of 
returns during any month which is referred as the Monthly 
Effect. Returns in the first half of any month could be much 
greater than the second half of the month.
The Weekly Effect refers to the unusual behavior of stock 
returns on Monday versus other days of the week. Much evidence 
shows that Monday stock returns are substantially lower, on 
average, than those on other days of the week.
Finally, a Daily Effect has also been found : stock prices
2 : [20] Radcliffe
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tend to increase dramatically in the last 15 minutes of trading, 
regardless of the day of week.
G. EARLY TESTS OF RANDOMNESS
The first known test of the random walk hypothesis was 
performed by a French mathematician, Bachelier, about 1900. 
Although he succesfully showed that the stock prices could be 
characterized as a random walk, his work lay dormant for more 
than fifty years. In 1953 Kendall [9] examined the correlation 
of weekly changes in nineteen British security price indices as 
well as spot price changes for cotton and wheat. In his analysis 
of the data Kendall suggested :
"The series looks like a wandering one, almost as if once 
a week the Demon of chance drew a random number from a 
symmetrical population of fixed dispersion and added it to the 
current price to determine the next week's price."
Since Kendall, a large number of tests of the random walk 
hypothesis have been performed.
Fama [12] examined daily returns of each of the 30 Dow 
Jones industrials during a time period beginning at the end of 
1957 and extending through September 1962. Using these data, he 
performed a variety of statistical tests. First correlation 
coefficients were calculated for daily returns on each of the 30 
Dow Jones industrials. For each company ten different 
correlations were found. The first correlation related the 
return on day 0 with return on day 1, the second correlated day 
0 with day 2, the third correlated day 0 with day 3, etc. That
1 2
is, returns on any particular day were correlated with each of 
the prior ten days' returns. On his analysis Fama found out some 
cases in which correlation coefficients are statistically 
different from zero. But such cases were rare and the level of 
correlation was small.
In addition to the daily returns correlations, Fama 
calculated correlations for returns using time intervals greater 
than a day. Returns were calculated over four, nine and sixteen 
day intervals and then correlated wuth prior four, nine and 
sixteen day returns. Again, few correlations were statistically 
different from zero and, in such cases, the correlation was 
small enough to be of no probable use to traders who rely upon 
clear trends.
Many other studies similar to Fama's were conducted during 
the 1960s and 1970s. On the whole,these studies indicated that :
1. Short-term security returns are generally unrelated to 
prior returns. This is true not only for the United States but 
also for many other countries.
2. In those cases where a significant correlation does 
exist between past and present returns, the size of the 
correlation is so slight that it is doubtful that profitable 
trading rules could be developed.
3. A minor tendency seems to exist toward positive 
correlation. But this can be explained by realizing that stocks 
contain risk and will, on average yield positive returns. The 
slight positive correlation in returns simply reflects long-run 
positive returns on stocks. When returns are adjusted for such a
13
risk impact, they show no correlation.
4. Tests on T-bill and futures prices suggest they, too, 
follow a random walk.
H. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RANDOM WALK
Recent random walk studies can be grouped into two 
categories; studies of return correlations and studies of return 
patterns(The January, Monthly, Weekly and Daily Effects).
In a study of January Ef feet, conducted by KEIM [18], 
portfolios of small firms always had January returns greater 
than portfolios of large firms during the period 1963-1979. 
Clearly something unusual is happening to small stocks in 
January. What this migth be is still unknown. The major 
explanation offered to date is known as the tax selling 
hypothesis.
ARIEL [2], on his study about monthly effect, found that 
during the period 1963-1981, returns in the first half of any 
month(on an equally weighted market index) were much greater 
than during the second half of the month. During this 19-year 
period, the annualized return during the first half of any month 
was 51.1% versus a 0.0% return during the second half of the 
month. Even the January returns were removed, Ariel found 
statistically significant average returns in each half of the 
month. Why this occurs is unexplained.
In a study which transactions data for all NYSE stocks 
during period between December 1981 and January 1983 were used, 
it was found that stock prices rose in the last 15 minutes of
1 4
trading 90 % of the time.
KEIM and STAMBAUGH [18] analyzed the Standard and Poor's 
Composite Index from 1928 through 1982. They found consistently 
negative Monday returns. They also found a positive correlation 
between Friday and Monday returns for the 30 individual stocks 
of the Dow Jones Industrial Index. They examined additional 
stocks, such as those of small (low-capitalization) firms and 
those traded over the counter. In all cases data exhibit a 
weekend effect. Their study also focused on potential 
explanations for the effect, such as measurement error, but 
concludes that none of explanations were satisfactory.
JAFFE and WESTERFIELD [15] examined the daily stock market 
returns for four countries,U.K., Japan, Australia and Canada. 
The specific data and time periods are : Japan-the Nikkei Dow
Index from January 5, 1 97 0 to April 30, 1983; Australia-the
States Actuaries Index from March 1, 1973 to November 30, 1982,
U.K.-the Financial Times Ordinary Share Index from January 2, 
1950 to November 30, 1983 and Canada-the Toronto Stock Exchange
Index from January 2, 1976 to November 30, 1983. For each
trading day they computed a return as the percentage change in 
the value of the index from the previous day using closing 
prices. Consistent with previous research on the U.S. stock 
markets, they found a negative average Monday return and high 
average Friday returns. This so called weekend effect is 
significant. A difference of the means statistical test was also 
performed by comparing Monday's average return with the average 
of the remaining days for each stock index. They found
15
statistically different average mean returns at reasonable 
levels of confidence.
JAFFE and WESTERFIELD also tried to explain the weekend 
effect in Canada, Australia, UK and Japan by a institutional 
factor of settlement procedures. They give following scenarios 
for a weekend effect to exist and analyze accordingly ; in 
Canada ( settlement after five business days) : buy stock at 
Friday close and sell stock at Monday close so pay money next 
Friday and receive money next Monday. Since cash payment occurs 
three days before cash receipt, Canadian stocks should have high 
expected returns on Monday. They applied same scenarios to 
Japan, UK and Australia. But expectation of scenarios to earn 
more and real data differs giving a conclusion that settlement 
procdures may not be a full explanation for weekend effects.
SOLNIK and BOUSQUET [20] presented the evidence on the day 
of the week effect on Paris Bourse. A strong and persistent 
negative return was found on Tuesdays. The tests were conducted 
using daily CAC index from January 1978 to December 1987. They 
found no satisfactory explanation for the negative Tuesday 
return on Paris Bourse.
BARONE [3] analyzed the MIB stock index between January 2, 
1975 and August 22, 1989. They found a January return on average 
0.33 percent which is significantly different from zero at a 
level of confidence less than 0.001. Positive changes that are 
significantly different from zero at a 5 percent confidence 
level were also found for the February, May and August months. A 
statistically negative return on Tuesdays at a 1 percent
1 6
confidence level was another conclusion of their study.
GIBBONS and HESS [11] studied to discover that the 
expected returns on cominon stocks and T-bills are not constant 
across days of the week. Their tests were conducted with the S & 
P 500 during the period July 2, 1962-Deceinber 28, 1978. The most 
obvious manifestation of the daily seasonal they found was the 
strong and persistent negative mean returns on Monday for stocks 
and below-average returns for bills on Mondays.
JACOBS and LEVY [14] indicated an overwhelming evidence 
that abnormal eguity returns are associated with the turn of the 
year, the week and the month, as well as with holidays and the 
time of the day. They pointed out that these returns were not 
unique to one historical period, nor can they be explained by 
considerations of risk or value. Their conceptual study showed 
some reasons about some these return abnormalities such as tax- 
loss selling at the year end, cash-flows at month end and 
negative news releases over the weekend.
CONNOLY [8] used daily return data drawn from the CRSP 
Daily. Its sample period run from the first trading day in 1963 
through the last trading day in 1983. And from a finance theory 
perspective he found that the evidence of a weekend anomaly is 
clearly dependent on the estimation method and the sample 
period. He resulted that when transaction costs are taken into 
account, the probability that arbitrage profits are available 
from the weekend-oriented strategies seems very small which is 
obviously consistent with an efficient markets approach.
JAFFE and WESTERFIELD [16] found a negative mean return on
1 7
Tuesdays for a possible reason of settlement process and 
measurement errors in the Japanese market.
ARIEL [2] used the daily stock index returns drawn from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted and 
equally-weighted daily index return files for the years 1963 
through 1982. He also examined hourly values for the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average on days surrounding holidays. He found a 
statistically significant high mean return on the day prior to 
holidays. On average the pre-holiday return equals nine to 
fourteen times the return accruing on non-pre-holidays.
CONDONYANNI, 0'HANLON and WARD [7] analysed the weekend 
effect in the national markets of Canada, U.K., France, 
Australia, Japan and Singapore and the influence of U.S. markets 
on these markets. They found significantly negative Tuesday for 
Australia, Japan and Singapore and lesser tendency for a 
negative Monday in Singapore and Australia. A positive Monday 
return in Japan was found. They also found some evidence about 
influence of US market and suggested that negative mean weekend 
returns do appear to be the norm rather than being US-specific.
I.EMPIRICAL TESTS OF MARKET EFFICIENCY-THE CASE FOR TURKEY
The Istanbul Securities Exchange (ISE) has started its 
operations on January 1986. For the first three years ISE could 
be considered as very thin(8.7 Billion TL trading volume on 
1986), market showed an enormous expansion and reached to 56,403 
Billion TL trading volume by the end of 1 992 (Table 9). Number 
of shares traded in 1986 was 3.3 million reached to 10,296
18
million on December,1992 (Table 9). The most important mission 
of stock exchange, market capitalization, increased from 709 
Billion TL on 1986 to 84,809 Billion TL on 1992 (Table 8). It is 
obvious that the market is not thin as it has started. The 
development of trading volume can be seen on Table 9, but these 
figures does not make ISE a developed market. The trading volume 
should be high enough to enable any individual investor to buy 
or sell large amount of securities in a very short term without 
much affecting prices, which also is not the case in ISE in 
today's trading volume.
The Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) has been computing and 
publicizing a stock price index (ISE Index) as a comprehensive 
measure of the market's trend since January 1986 (Figure 1). The 
basic formula for calculating the Istanbul Stock Exchange Index 
is as follows :
75
It = ill75 
i = 1
>i,t * ( )
* 100 where.
p . *I/O ( N ■ * W ·'■ ^^ 1,0  1,0
Pj _ = Base period price of i^^ stock1 f CJ
Nj = Base period total no. of shares of i^ ^^  stock± f  U
Wj _ = The portion of i^ I* stock open to public in base periodI/O
i/1 = Price of i^ I* stock at period t
N j thj i- = Total no. of shares of i stock at period t± f  L
W.: „ = The portion of i^^ stock open to public in period t± f  U
3: [13] ISE Bulletin
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So, is an indicator of the change in total market value of a 
common stock relative to the base period value. This index is a 
measure of value for an equally weighted portfolio of 75 stocks 
formed as the base period. The base period value of each stock 
is taken as a weighted average of January 1986 prices of that 
stock. Stock splits are also accounted for by this formula.
Some empirical studies on Forms of Efficiency were studied 
by Alparslan, Basel and Cadirci.
In the study carried out by Alparslan [1], the weak form 
efficiency tests were applied to the ISE adjusted price data. 
Statistical tests of independence (autocorrelation and run 
tests) and tests of trading rules (filter rules) have been used 
in these tests.
Although the runs and autocorrelation tests could not 
refute the weak form efficiency, the results of the filter tests 
revealed that an investor could have beaten the market for some 
stocks. Due to the large discrepancies between the buy and hold 
filter returns, Alparslan supports the views which are against 
the efficiency os Istanbul Stock Exchange.
Basel [4] investigated the distributional and time series 
behaviour of common stock returns in ISE for the period 1986- 
1988. The study shows that published past price information can 
not be used to obtain better forecasts of future prices. 
Although, this observation is in line with the random walk 
behaviour the test of variance-time function indicate 
significant long term dependence for most of the stocks which is 
against weak form efficiency.
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Cadirci [5] analyzed market adjustment to the release of 
stock dividend/right offering information (semi-strong form of 
efficiency) for the stocks listed in ISE for the period 1 986- 
1989. Results of the study indicated that the adjustment process 
was slow and positive cumulative average abnormal returns are 
observed after the event date which leads to the rejection of 
market efficiency in the semi-strong sense and possibility of an 
above normal profit.
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. THE DATA
This study uses daily values of the Istanbul Stock Exchange 
Index from January 4, 1988 to December 31, 1992.
The ISE Index is used as a proxy for the realized rate of 
return on the market. This index is weighted by market value so 
price trends in the market is reflected through variations in 
the market value. The basic formula^ for calculating the index 
is as follows :
Sum of Market Values of the Portion of Constituent 
Companies' Market Open to the Public
----------------------------------------------------k Base Number
Total Market Value of the Companies in the Base Period
Using each day's closing price, a return as the percentage
change in the value of the index from the previous day was
computed. The formula used for calculating daily percentage
returns is as follows :
Pl· - Pi
Rt
Rt = t-1 where
t-1
t^-1
percentage return for day t, 
index value for day t, 
index value for day t-1 .
4 : Istanbul Stock Exchange Bulletin, June 1992
5 : Except Barone[3] all authors used percentage return method 
for calculating daily returns. Barone used a continuously 
compounded rate of change of the stock index which is calculated 
as R^=ln(P^/P^_-j).
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During the entire sample period the trading days returns 
before and after a holiday were excluded from the data for 
preventing the distortion of holiday effect. So return values 
corresponding to 1223 trading days in the sample period were 
reduced to 1127 return values^.
The data were divided into two subsets : Period 1 covers
from January 4,1988 to October 5,1990 and Period 2 covers from 
October 8,1990 to December 12,1992. This division was made 
because settlement day for the exchange was decreased from 2 
days to 1 .
B. METHODOLOGY
1.TESTS OF THE DAY OF THE WEEK EFFECT
nTo test the day of the week effect the following model was 
used :
^t= ^1^1 ®2 ° 2 ^4^4  ^  ^^t
where
: the return of index,
u.(- : an error term assumed to be normally distributed with zero 
mean and finite variance,
D-^ : a dummy variable for Monday (i.e. D^ = l if observation
falls on a Monday and 0 otherwise),
D2 : a dummy variable for Tuesday (i.e. observation
falls on a Tuesday and 0 otherwise).
6 .· All analysis with the original data was also done.
1 : Barone[3], Solnik and Bousquet[21], Connoly[8]. All authors 
used the same methodology to analyze day of the week effect.
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The coefficients of the equation are mean returns from 
Monday through Friday. The regresión was run to find out whether 
daily returns could explain market return or not. The null 
hypothesis is :
Hq ■ ai =a9=a^=a/i =ac; = 0
which indicates that mean of return values for days of the 
week are zero,hence no day of the week effect. The null 
hypothesis is rejected if the F-statistic of the test is larger 
than corresponding f value of specific significance level and 
degree of freedom.
2. TESTS OF THE WEEKEND EFFECT
OThe following regression® was run to test of the weekend 
effect;
R|-= a-j + a 2 D2 + ^3^3  ^ 41*4 ^5 ^5  ^ '^ t
where
R4- : the return of index,
an error term assumed to be normally distributed with zero 
mean and finite variance,
a dummy variable for Tuesday (i.e. D2=1 if observation falls 
on a Tuesday and 0 otherwise),
D3 ; a dummy variable for Wednesday (i.e. 03=1 if observation
falls on a Wednesday and 0 otherwise), 
a·^ : mean return of Monday.
8 : Barone[3] used this regression to analyze mean differences
between Monday and other days of the week. Other authors used 
mean difference tests (t test) between Monday and each other days 
of the week.
t^
^t
Do
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The coefficients of the equation are differences between 
mean returns of Monday and other days of the week. The regresión 
were run for the mean difference test. The null hypothesis is :
H0 a2-a3-a4-a5 - 0
which indicates that differences between mean of return 
values for days of the week and Monday mean value are zero,hence 
no weekend effect.
Since Monday average return values do not significntly 
differ from zero applying above methodology to find a result of 
existence of weekend effect do not bring a feasible solution. To 
verify a possible weekend effect which is mostly related to 
settlement procedure in the market, the above test was applied 
to Tuesday. That is a difference between mean return of Tuesday 
and mean return of other days was analyzed.
3.TESTS OF THE MONTHLY EFFECTS
To test for monthly effects the same approach as in day 
of the week effect is used and following regression model^ was 
run :
Rf= a-|D-| + a2D2 + a3D3 + a^D^ + a^D^ + agDg + a^Dy + agDg +
agDg + a-|QD-,Q + a-|-|D-|-, + a^2^l2 ^t
where
: the return of index,
u^ : an error term assumed to be normally distributed with zero 
mean and finite variance,
9 ; Barone [4] used regression to find monthly effects in
Italian stock market.
25
DD-, : a dummy variable for January (i.e. D^=1 if observation 
falls on a January and 0 otherwise),
: a dummy variable for February (i.e. Ü2=1 if observation 
falls on a February and 0 otherwise).
The coefficients of the equation are mean returns from 
January through December. The regresión was run to find out 
whether daily returns of specific months could explain market 
return or not. The null hypothesis for this test is :
H0 ai -a2-a3-a4-a5-ag-a7-ag-a9-a-| Q-a-, -a-| 2~0
which indicates that mean of return values for months of 
the year are zero,hence no turn of the year effect.
4. TESTS OF THE TURN OF THE YEAR (JANUARY) EFFECT
To make a turn of the year (January) Effect test the 
1 0following regression was run :
R^= a-| + a2D2 + ^ 3^3  ^ 4 ^ 4  "*■ ^ 5 ^ 5  a^D^ + aoDp +
igug 1- d-| qD-| q + a-|^ l^-| -|
where
6^^6 17U7 8^^8
aoDa + a Q -]D--| + a-| 2D-] 2 +
Ri
U4
D-
D-
the return of index,
an error term assumed to be normally distributed with zero 
mean and finite variance,
a dummy variable for February (i.e. D2=1 if observation
falls on a February and 0 otherwise),
a dummy variable for March (i.e. 0^=1 if observation falls 
on a Wednesday and 0 otherwise).
10 : Barone[3] used this regression to analyze mean differences 
between January and other months of the year.
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a-| : mean return of January.
The coefficients of the equation are differences between 
mean returns of January and other months of the year. The 
regresión was run for the mean difference test. The null 
hypothesis is :
Hq : a2=a3=a4=a5=a0=aY=ag=ag=a-| Q=a-| 1 =a·^ 2=0
which indicates that differences between mean of return 
values for months of the year and mean values of January are 
zero, hence no January effect.
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Table 1 reports the sample return and standard deviation 
of days of the week. When two-tailed t—tests applied to day 
return values it is found that for the entire period the mean 
returns of Friday and Wednesday are significantly different from 
zero and positive.
All return values for period 1 (Table 1 ) are not different 
from zero which is a sign of efficiency of market. This finding 
is also supported by the results found in regression analysis. 
F-value of regression analysis for period 1 (1.55-Table 2) do 
not rejects the null hypothesis of equality of mean return 
values of days of the week.
For period 2, significant negative Tuesday return and 
positive Friday, Wednesday returns were found when two-tailed t- 
test was applied to the day returns. The F-value of regression 
for this period was 2 . 2 2 which rejects the null hypothesis of 
equality of regression coefficients. That is day of the week 
effect was found for Period 2.
The differences of results between periods of t-tests of 
day returns and regression analysis about day of the week effect 
are as follows :
- Mean of Monday return values changes from positive in 
Period 1 to negative in Period 2 (both values are not 
significant),
-Mean of Tuesday return values changes from positive in 
Period 1 to negative in Period 2 (negative value is 
significant),
PART IV. FINDINGS
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- For the Period 1 the null hypothesis of equality of 
regression coefficients was not rejected, where it is rejected 
for Period 2.
- Tuesday is the only significant contributor to the market 
return in regression analysis with (t value 2.25) for Period 2.
For the entire period day of the week effect was not found 
but F value has a significancy of 10%. The only significant 
contributor in the regression model for the entire period was 
Friday returns.
The weekend effect by definition is a return pattern occured 
due to positive Friday returns and negative Monday returns. But 
Turkish market shows a positive Monday return on Period 1 and 
negative Monday return Period 2 and both numbers are not 
significant. The results of weekend effect analysis were given 
on Table 3. The regression was run to find the existence of 
differences between Monday returns and returns of other days of 
the week. For the first period null hypothesis was not rejected 
meaning that Monday mean returns were not different than mean of 
other days. For the second period the null hypothesis was 
rejected. But this finding might not bring a result of 
existence of weekend effect due to the fact that Monday returns, 
themselves, are first not negative for Period 1 and secondly not 
statistically different from zero.
For the above reason and having a significant negative 
Tuesday return on Period 2, a further analysis of weekend effect 
was performed between Tuesday returns and other days for a 
longer weekend. Results of this analysis were given on Table 7.
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For Period 2, F value rejects the null hypothesis with a 
significancy of 2.25%, meaning a weekend effect between Friday 
and Tuesday.
Therefore for the second period the inefficiency of market 
were being obvious due to the existence of return patterns of 
day of the week and weekend. Both effects are closely related to 
negative Tuesdays and positive Fridays. The market was efficient 
in the first period but findings originating from second period 
more likely explain the real structure of the market because in 
the first period the ISE was very thin, there are few 
participants {individual investors, corporates) in the market 
and market capitalization and trade volume was very low (Figure 
10-1 1 ).
The sample return and standard deviation for returns of 
months of the year are reported in Table 4. The mean return for 
January is positive and significant at the 1% level on first 
period and entire period. Mean returns on September for first 
period and on June for second period is positive at the 5%
level.
Tests of the regression equation about month effect are 
reported in Table 5. For the first period the F-statistic(1.96) 
rejects the null hypothesis. For the second period the F- 
statistic do not reject the null hypothesis. January and 
September contributes significant information to the model for 
first period. The F-statistic for the entire sample period 
rejects the null hypothesis which means that there exists a 
return pattern proving market's inefficiency in monthwise.The
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key month contributing significant information on market return 
is January. January returns are always significant in the model. 
In period 2 null hypothesis of equality of monthly returns other 
than January, was not rejected (Table 6-F value 1.18). For the 
entire period null hypothesis is rejected, that is there was 
significant difference between returns of January and returns of 
other months.
Major differences between periods of results of t-tests of 
month returns and regression analysis to find monthly effect- 
January effect are as follows :
- Mean of January return values are significantly different 
from zero in the first and entire period but not in Period 2,
- 1.7% significant positive September return values in 
Period 1 changes to negative in Period 2 (negative value is 
insignificant),
- For the Period 1 the null hypothesis of equality of 
regression coefficients was rejected, where it is not rejected 
for Period 2.
The data were reduced by exclusion of pre and post holiday 
returns from the data. To check whether this exclusion affects 
the results of analysis, all analysis were also done with 
original data but no different findings listed above was 
observed with these analysis.
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The weak form efficiency of a market requires that "changes 
in stock prices will be random therefore there should not be any 
consistent return patterns in security returns"[Radcliffe (20)]. 
In this study weak form efficiency of the Turkish Stock Market 
is tested by investigating the patterns observed in other stock 
market's of the world. Specifically, Day of the Week, Weekend, 
Month of the Year and Turn of the Year( January ) Effects were 
analyzed. Data set divided into two parts with the underlying 
property of settlement duration change. The results of 1990-1992 
period focused more since it reflects market more with its 
higher trading volume and capitalization numbers than 1988-1990 
period.
Results of the analysis about day of the week effect shows 
that Turkish Stock Market changes its property of being 
efficient as time goes. Although day of the week effect was not 
found for entire sample period, 1990-1992 period shows a 
significant day of the week effect. A significant positive 
Friday return was found similar to other stock markets in the 
world. Another similarity is the negative Tuesday return in the 
1990-1992 period. Major differences between findings of two 
periods like changing of Monday average returns from positive to 
negative and Tuesday's changing from positive to negative 
supported the conclusion of market's trend of being inefficient.
The positive Friday return and negative Monday return 
creates so called weekend effect. Turkish market also shows
PART V. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
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weekend effect in the 1990-1992 period but this finding may be 
misleading. Friday returns are significantly positive for both 
periods but Monday returns are negative in the 1990-1992 period 
and it is not significant. This finding focused the analysis of 
weekend effect to test Tuesday returns for a longer weekend 
between Friday and Tuesday. Results shows a significant 
difference between Tuesday returns and returns of other days of 
the week.
A scenario about using settlement to earn abnormal returns 
like buying stocks on Friday and selling on Monday brings 
expectation of Tuesday's positive return. But data shows that 
Tuesday returns are significantly negative for the second period 
so settlement is not a complete explanation for weekend effect 
to occur.
Another reason for the weekend effect to occur is 
announcement of bad news about firms at weekends. Firms may 
delay such announcements until the weekend for the fear of panic 
selling, so allow more time for the information to be digested. 
This reason may be a explanation of weekend effect in the 
Turkish Market but will be a subject of another study. 
With the above findings it may be concluded that market with a 
positive return on Fridays (buyers in the market) shows negative 
returns on Monday-Tuesday and adjust itself on Wednesdays. 
Thursday shows a little positive yield and again a positive 
return on Friday.
The most significant result of this study is strong turn of 
the year effect. The most commonly cited reason for the January
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Effect is tax-loss selling which is investor's wishing of 
reducing taxes by realizing capital losses at the end of the 
year and buying the stocks again on January. But the tax-loss 
hypothesis does not seem fully satisfactory. First, there is 
little evidence that selling pressure near year-end is strong 
and secondly it is not clear for the rational investors to wait 
the new year for reinvesting.
Another rationale for the January effect is year-end 
"window-dressing". In this view some portfolio and fund managers 
dump embrassing stocks at year-end to avoid their appearance on 
the annual report. This rationale is not suitable for the 
Turkish market because there are no professional portfolio 
managers in the market and most of the fund managers prefer to 
use T-bills of low-risk high return in their funds.
The broad cycle (Friday-Tuesday) defined above will be an 
sign for the speculators to earn abnormal returns but when 
transaction costs are taken into account, the probability that 
arbitrage profits are available from trading strategies oriented 
from above cycle seems very small. Using the result of a 
significant positive January return will also be an implication 
of this study for the investors to form a trading strategy.
Since this study is open to public, every individual 
investor and corporates may use the findings of this study. 
People try to sell on Fridays which will lower Friday returns 
thus market gains efficiency. That is since prices will tend to 
reflect all known information market become more efficient and 
this will be the most crucial implication of this study.
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There are some shortcomings of this study which may light 
the findings of the study more if covered on further researchs. 
One shortcoming of the analysis was shortness of analysis period 
when compared with the periods of studies throughout the world. 
Results may be more satisfactory if same analysis performed for 
a longer period. Weekend effect under the reason of bad news 
releases on weekends and the effect of US and European Market 
Weekend Effects on Turkish Market Weekend anomaly may be studied 
to obtain a satisfactory explanation. Also Monday return can be 
accepted as a 3 calendar day return and weekend effect test can 
be studied accordingly.
The index announced by the Istanbul Stock Exchange is taken 
as a measure of market return. But Istanbul Stock Exchange 
changed the structure of the index at 1990. The value weighted 
composite index including 75 companies quoted in the market are 
being used through that date. Since market capitalization is 
still low, a drastic movement in a specific stock which has a 
high weight in the index formula may change the index through 
the side it performs although market has not moved in that way. 
So a better further study may be done by investigating the 
calendar anomalies on certain stocks (i.e. most frequently 
traded 30 stocks).
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MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND T VALUES OF DAILY RETURNS
TABLE 1
Period Statistic Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
04.01.88-05.10.90 Mean 0.461 0.452 0.346 0 . 0 2 1 0.257Std.dev. 3.500 3.251 3.196 2.676 2.512No.obs. 1 1 7 1 20 11 9 1 20 1 22t value * 1 . 43 1 . 52 1.18 0.09 1.13
08.10.90-31.12.92 Mean -0.057 -0.685 0.466 0.009 0.591Std.dev. 3.983 2.958 2.352 3.326 2.808No.obs. 1 06 1 06 106 1 07 1 04t value * -0.15 -2.39 2.04 0.03 2.15
04.01.88-31.12.92 Mean 0.215 -0.081 0.402 0.016 0.411Std.dev. 3.737 3.162 2.824 2.993 2.652No.obs. 223 226 225 227 226t value * 0 . 8 6 -0.39 2.14 0.08 2.33
* The underlined figures are significantly different from zeroat the 5% level.
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TABLE 2
TEST OF THE DAY OF THE WEEK EFFECT *
Statistic Model Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday____ Friday
04.01 .88-05.1 0.90
08.10.90-31.12.92
04.01.88-31.12.92
Coefficient 
t value ** 
deg. of fr. 
f value ***
Coefficient 
t value ** 
deg. of fr. 
f value ***
Coefficient 
t value ** 
deg. of fr. 
f value ***
593 
1 . 55
524
2.22
1 1 22 
1 .81
0.461 
1 . 64
-0.057
-0.19
0.215 
1 .04
0.452 
1 . 63
-0.685 
-2.25
-0.081
-0.40
0.346 
1 .24
0.466 
1 .53
0.402 
1 .95
0.021
0.08
0.009 
0.03
0.016
0.08
**
'k'ki<
0.257
0.93
0.591 
1.92 ****
0.411
2.00
Rt=b1 D1 -i-b2D2-t-b3D3-i-b4D4-i-b5D5-i-ut 
Null Hypothesis HO:b1=b2=b3=b4=b5=0
The underlined figures are significantly different from zero at the 5% level, meaning 
contributing significant information to the model in presence of other variables
figures are significantly different from zero at the 5% level, which indicates 
**** of null hypothesis. Market return can be explained by daily returns,significant %5.o4
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TABLE 3
TEST OF THE WEEKEND EFFECT (MONDAY) *
Period Statistic Model Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
04.01.88-05.10.90 Coefficient 
t value ** 
deg. of fr. 
f value ***
593
0.42
-0.009
-0 . 0 2
-0.115 
-0.29
-0.440 
-1 . 11
-0.204 
-0.52
08.10.90-31.12.92 Coefficient 
t value ** 
deg. of fr. 
f value ***
524
2.73
-0.629 
-1 . 46
0.522 
1 . 21
0.066
0.15
0.647 
1 .50
04.01.88-31.12.92 Coefficient 
t value ** 
deg. of fr. 
f value ***
1 1 22 
1.17
-0.297 
-1 . 02
0.187
0.64
-0.199
-0 . 6 8
0.195
0.67
Test of difference between mean returns of Monday and other davs 
Rt=a1+b2D2+b3D3+b4D4+b5D5+ut 
Null Hypothesis HO:b2=b3=b4=b5=0
The underlined figures are significantly different from zero at the 5% level, mei 
*** significant information to the model in presence of other variables
r S j e c ? ? n 5  o r L f i ' h i p o t S ^ i s ! " " ^ ^  - ^ i - t e s
meaning
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TABLE 4
MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION AND T VALUES OF THE MONTHS OF THE YEAR *
Period Statistic Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
04.01.88-05.10.90
08.10.90-31.12.92
04.01.88-31.12.92
Mean 
Std.dev.
No.obs. 
t value *'■'
Mean 
Std.dev.
No.obs. 
t value **
Mean 
Std.dev.
No.obs. 
t value **
1.438 0.131 -0.38 0.032 0.629 0.150 0.353
3.382 3.654 2.776 2.267 2.533 2.174 2 . 5 7 7
48 49 61 55 51 64
2.95 0.25 -1.06 0.10 1.77 0.55 43 0.90
-0.14 1.015 0.125 -0.26 0.647 
3.776 3.102 4.279 2.850 2.335 
57 45
1.121 -0.20 -0.01 -0.77 -0.12 0.903 -0.40
4.236 3.484 2.394 2.227 3.011 2.517 2 . 3 5 5
42 40 43 25 41
1.71 -0.37 -0.02 -1.72 -0.25
32 46
2.03 -1.16
51
-0.27
0.225
3.262
41
0.44
35 39
2.47 0.20 -0.55 1.73
-0.24 -0.50 0.333 0.224 
2.126 2.046 3.824 4.090
42
-0.74
52 
-1 . 76
63
0.69
62
0.43
1.290 -0.02 -0.22 -0.22 0.297 0.401 -0.04
3.786 3.562 2.619 2.271 2.766 2.308 2.480
90 89 104 80 92
3.23 -0.05 -0.87 -0.86 1.03
96 89
1.70 -0.14
0.022 0.482 -0.21 0.120 0.387
3.542 2.789 3.273 3.504 3.509
92 99 97 98 101
0.06 1.72 -0.63 0.34 1.11
* The percentage rates of change corresponding to pre and post holidays 
have been excluded.
** The underlined figures are significantly different from zero 
at the 5% level.
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TABLE 5
TEST OF THE MONTH OF THE YEAR EFFECT *
Period Statistic Model Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Dec
04.01.88-05.10.90 Coefficient 
t value ** 
deg. of fr. 
f value ***
586 
1 .96
1.438 0.131 
3.29 0.30
-0.38 0.032 
-0.98 0.08
0.629 
1 . 49
0.150 0.353 
0.40 0.77
-0.14
-0.33
1.015
2.54
0.125
0.28
-0.26
-0.52
0.647 
1 .34
08.10.90-31.12.92 Coefficient 
t value ** 
deg. of fr. 
f value ***
517 
1 .09
1 . 1 2 1 -0 . 2 0  
2.31 -0.40
-0.01 -0.77 
-0 . 0 1 -1 . 2 2
-0 . 1 2
-0.24
0.903 -0.40 
1.62 -0.87
0.225
0.46
-0.24
-1.14
-0.50 
0.84
0.333 
0.56
0.224
0.43
04.01.88-31.12.92 Coefficient 
t value ** 
deg. of fr. 
f value ***
1115 
1 .98
1 .290 -0 . 0 2  
3.97 -0.06
-0 . 2 2 -0 . 2 2  
-0.74 -0.63
0.297
0.92
0.401 -0.04 
1.28 -0 . 11
0 . 0 2 2  
0.07
0.482 
1 .56
-0 . 21
-0.67
0 . 1 2 0
0.39
0.387 
1 .26
* Rt-bl D1+b2D2+b3D3+b4D4+b5D5+b6D6+b7D7+b8D8+b9D9+b10D10+b1lDl1+b12Dl2+ut
Null Hypothesis HO:b1=b2=b3=b4=b5=b6=b7=b8=b9=b10=b11=b1 2 = 0 
** The underlined figures are significantly different from zero at the 5% level, meaning 
*** significant information to the model in presence of other variables.
figures are significantly different from zero at the 5% level, which indicates 
re:iecting of null hypothesis. Market return can be explained by monthly returns.
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TABLE 6
TEST OF THE TURN OF THE YEAR (JANUARY) EFFECT *
Period
04.01.88-05.10.90
08.10.90-31.12.92
04.01.88-31.12.92
Statistic Model Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Coefficient 
t value * * 
deg. of fr. 586 
f value *** 1.58
Coefficient 
t value ** 
deg. of fr. 517 
f value *** 1.18
Coefficient 
t value ** 
deg. of fr. 1115 
f value *** 1 . 7 7
- 1 .31 
-2 .1 3
-1 . 32
-1.82 -1.41 -0.81 -1.29 -1.08 -1.58 -0.42 -1.31 
—3.· I 1 n2..· 36 -1.33 -2.23 -1.71 -2.60 -0.71 -2.09 ■1 .70 -0.79 -2.53 -1 .21
-1.13 1.89 -1.24 -0.22 -1.52 -0.89 -1.36 -1.62 -0.79 -0.90 
-1.90 -1.65 -2.37 -1.79 -0.29 -2.27 -1.30 -1.98 -2.48 -1.23 -1 . 4 3
-1 .31 
-2.84
-1 .51 
-3.41
-1 .51 
-3.18 -0.99 -0.89 -1.32 -1.27 -0.81 -2.1 7 -1 .96 -2 . 88 -2 . 77 -1 .80 -1 .50 -3.32
-1.17 -0.90 
-2.60 -2 . 0 2
* Rt a1 -'-b2D2-^ bЗDЗ-^ b4D4-^ b5D5-^ -b6D6-^ b7D7-ı-b8D8-ı-b9D9-^ b1 ODI O-i-bl 1 D1 1 -^b1 2D1 2-i-ut 
Null Hypothesis HO:b2=b3=b4=b5=b6=b7=b8=b9=b10=b11=b12=0
significantly different from zero at the 5% level, meaning
*** mho ^^^ting significant information to the model in presence of other variables.
significantly different from zero at the 5% level, which indicates rejectina of 
ypo esis. There exists significantly different mean returns between January and other months.
TABLE 7
TEST OF THE WEEKEND EFFECT (TUESDAY) *
Period Statistic Model Monday Wednesday Thursday Friday
04.01.88-05.10.90 Coefficient 
t value ** 
deg. of fr. 
f value ***
593
0.42
-0.009 
-0 . 0 2
-0.105 
-0.27
-0.430 
-1 . 09
-0.195
-0.49
08.10.90-31 .1 2.92 Coefficient 
t value ** 
deg. of fr. 
f value ***
524
2.73
-0.629 
-1 . 46
1.151
2.67
0.694 
1 . 62
1 . 270 
2.95
0-4.01 .88-31 .12.92 Coefficient 
t value ** 
deg. of fr. 
f value ***
1 1 22 
1.17
0.296 
1 . 0 2
0.483 
1 . 66
0.097
0.33
0.492 
1 .69
* Test of difference between mean 
Rt=a2+blD1+b3D3+b4D4+b5D5+ut returns of Tuesday and other days
iNurx HYpotnesis HU:b1=b3=b4=b5 = 0
The underlined figures are significantly different from zero at the 5% level meaninn 
*** significant information to the model in presence of other variables ^
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TABLE 8
MAIN INDICATORS REGARDING CORPORATIONS QUOTED AT ISE EQUITY MARKET
COMPANIES WHOSE EQUITIES ARE TRADED AT ISE
YEAR NO. OFCORPORATIONS
TOTAL NOMINAL(I) CAPITAL 
(BILLION TL)
1986 348 796.01987 41 4 1,614.01 988 556 3,132.01989 730 6,727.01990 916 14,476.01991 1 092 32,304.11992 1 238 49,139.4
TOTAL NOMINAL 
CAPITAL (BILLION TL)
TOTAL MARKET CAPITALIZATION (BILLION TL) p/e RATIO(%)
TURNOVER 
RATIO 
_____ (%)
293.7 709.0 5 .1 1 . 2469.9 3,182.0 15.9 3.3841 . 2 2,048.0 5.0 7.32,653.5 15,553.0 15.7 1 1 . 210,036.8 55,238.0 23.9 27.722,487.0 78,907.0 15.9 44.931,847.5 84,809.0 11.4 66.5
(1) Total Nominal Capital of All Listed CompaniesSource : Capital Market Board Monthly Bulletin, December 1992
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MAIN INDICATORS ABOUT ISE EQUITY MARKET
TABLE 9
YEAR
NO. OF 
WORKING DAYS TRADING VOL. (BILLION TL)
NO.OF SHARES TRADED 
(MILLION)
AVG. DAILY TRADING VOL. (BILLION TL)
AVG. DAILY NO. OF SHARES 
TRADED (MILLION)
NUMBER OF 
CONTRACTS TRADED (THOUSAND) ISE INDEX (100 AT JAN.8 6 )
1986 247 8 ., 71987 266 1 05 ,. 41988 253 1 49 ,. 01989 255 1,735.. 91990 247 1 5,313., 11991 247 35,556,,81992 251 56,403., 5
3.3 0 . 0 0 . 014.7 0.4 0.131 .7 0 . 6 0.1238.0 6 . 8 0.91,534.9 62.0 6 .24,539.0 144.0 18.410,296.4 224.7 41 . 0
112 . 1  
246.8 746.7 
1,446.5 
1,681.9
170.9 673.0 373 2,217 
3,255 
4,369 4,004
Source : Capital Market Board Monthly Bulletin, December 1992
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TABLE 10
CALENDAR ANOMALIES FOR DIFFERENT MARKETS
Country Index Period Settlement _______ Day Day of Negatiye Negatiye Positiye week Monday Tuesdav Fridav
USA SP 500 1962-1983 5 yes yes no yes yes yes
JAPAN NIKKEI DOW 1970-1983 3 yes yes yes yes^^^ yes _
U.K. LSE 1950-1983 1 ACC.PERIOD* yes yes no yes yes _
CANADA TORONTO 1976-1983 5 yes yes no yes yes _
AUSTRALIA STATEX 1973-1983 1 - 10 yes yes yes yes yes _
ITALY MIB 1975-1989 END OF MONTH yes yes yes yes yes yes
FRANCE CAC 1978-1987 END OF MONTH yes no yes yes no _
TURKEY ISE 1988-1992 1 yes no yes^^ yes no yes
* 2 Weeks-3 Weeks
significant in 1990-1992 oeriodtrading day of week for significant in the 1990-1992 Japan is Saturday period
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RATIONALES FOR CALENDAR ANOMALIES IN STOCK MARKETS
TABLE 11
Type of Effect Rationale
Day of the Week
Weekend
Turn of the Year(January)
Measurement Error**
Settlement
Bad News Announcements at weekends 
Settlement
Integration of Stock Markets Throughout the World * 
Time Zone Difference of Different Markets 
Integration of Foreign Exchange with Stock Returns 
Window Dressing of Portfolios, Portfolio Adjustment 
Tax—loss selling at year ends
Cash-flow patterns of individual investors ***
* Influence of US Weekend Effect on Other Markets
i.e. correlation between Monday and Friday, taking Monday return as a 3 day return, small sample size
*** Annual bonuses, holiday gifts might be invested in stock markets
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60,000-
50,000-
40,000-
C
0•HiH 30,000-n
20,000-
1 0,0 0 0-
ISE Equity Market
T o t a l  T ra d in g  Vo lum e
15313.1
8.7 105.4 149
T
1735.9
56403.5
35556.8
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
59
Figure 10
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Figure 11
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